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Abstract 
 
In this paper, we assess the impact of fiscal consolidation on income inequality. Using a 
panel of 18 industrialized countries from 1978 to 2009, we find that income inequality 
significantly rises during periods of fiscal consolidation. In addition, while fiscal policy 
that is driven by spending cuts seems to be detrimental for income distribution, tax 
hikes seem to have an equalizing effect. We also show that the size of the fiscal 
consolidation program (in percentage of GDP) has an impact on income inequality. In 
particular, when consolidation plans represent a small share of GDP, the income gap 
widens, suggesting that the burden associated with the effort affects disproportionately 
households at the bottom of the income distribution. Considering the linkages between 
banking crises and fiscal consolidation, we find that the effect on the income gap is 
amplified when fiscal adjustments take place after the resolution of such financial 
turmoils. Similarly, fiscal consolidation programs combined with inflation are likely to 
increase inequality and the effects of fiscal adjustments on inequality are amplified 
during periods of relatively low growth. Our results also provide support for a nonlinear 
relationship between inequality and income and corroborate the idea that trade can 
promote a more equal distribution of income. 
 
Keywords: Fiscal consolidation, income inequality, Kuznets curve. 
JEL: E62, E64, D63. 
 
 
Résumé 
 
Dans cet article, nous évaluons l'impact de la consolidation budgétaire sur l'inégalité des 
revenus. Utilisant un panel de 18 pays industrialisés de 1978 à 2009, nous constatons 
que l'inégalité des revenus augmente de façon significative pendant les périodes de 
consolidation budgétaire. En outre, alors qu’une consolidation axée sur la réduction des 
dépenses semble être préjudiciable pour la distribution des revenus, des hausses 
d'impôts semblent avoir un effet égalisateur. Nous montrons aussi que la taille du 
programme de consolidation budgétaire (en pourcentage du PIB) a un impact sur 
l'inégalité des revenus. En particulier, lorsque les plans de consolidation ne représentent 
qu'une faible part du PIB, l'écart de revenu se creuse, ce qui suggère que le fardeau 
associé à l'effort affecte de manière disproportionnée les ménages au bas de la 
distribution des revenus. Considérant les liens entre crises bancaires et l'assainissement 
budgétaire, nous constatons que l'effet sur l'écart de revenu est amplifié lorsque des 
ajustements budgétaires ont lieu après la résolution de ces tourmentes financières. De 
même, les programmes d'assainissement budgétaire accompagnés d’inflation forte sont 
susceptibles d'accroître les inégalités et les effets des ajustements budgétaires sur 
l'inégalité sont amplifiés durant les périodes de croissance relativement faible. Nos 
résultats plaideront également pour l’existence d’une relation non linéaire entre 
l'inégalité et le revenu et corroborent aussi l'idée que le commerce peut promouvoir une 
répartition plus équitable des revenus. 
 
Mots clés : Consolidation budgétaire, l'inégalité des revenues, Kuznets curve. 
JEL: E62, E64, D63. 
“Growing inequality is a “key test” for market economy.” 
Mario Monti, 17 May 2009 
 
1. Introduction 
The most recent financial turmoil that emerged in 2008 led to a quick and 
aggressive response by monetary authorities with the aim of boosting the economy. 
However, its deepening and severity associated with the collapse and massive 
destruction of asset wealth made visible that large fiscal stimulus programs should be a 
key additional ingredient of the policy mix. As a result, fiscal authorities in many G20 
countries implemented comprehensive support packages based on expenditure hikes 
which, combined with cyclical revenue losses, resulted in sharp increases in budget 
deficits. 
More recently, the uncertainty regarding the economic path and the concerns 
about long-term (un)sustainability of public finances has supported in a relatively 
consensual way the view about the need to withdraw such stimulus and the emergence 
of the implementation of budgetary consolidation measures. This should, in turn, deliver 
a return to more “normal” fiscal stances and sustain the path of debt growth. 
In this context, it is interesting to investigate the impact of fiscal consolidations 
on income inequality. In fact, while some literature has been devoted towards 
addressing the linkages between fiscal consolidation and economic growth, there is an 
important gap regarding our understanding of the effects of such fiscal programs on the 
distribution of income. 
Will fiscal austerity measures increase inequality or contribute to a more even 
distribution of income? To which extent does such relationship depend on whether 
fiscal consolidation is led by spending cuts or tax hikes? Is it more likely to affect 
income inequality when undertaken during a severe financial crisis or afterwards? 
These questions have gained a renewed momentum in recent times, especially, if 
one takes into account that, in order to deal with financial crises, governments have 
employed a broad range of policies, which reallocated wealth toward banks and debtors 
and away from taxpayers. We aim at providing the answers to the abovementioned 
questions in this work. 
Overall, we find that during periods of fiscal consolidation, income inequality 
significantly rises. However, while fiscal adjustments that are led by spending cuts tend 
to be detrimental for income distribution, tax hikes seem to have an equalizing effect.  
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The empirical evidence also suggests that the size of the fiscal consolidation 
program (in percentage of GDP) and its composition matters for income distribution. In 
particular, the income gap substantially widens when consolidation plans represent a 
relative small share of GDP (below 1%) and spending cuts exceed 0.77% of GDP. 
Therefore, the burden associated with such fiscal austerity measures affects 
disproportionately households at the bottom of the income distribution. By contrast, tax 
increases above 0.57% of GDP tend to significantly reduce income inequality. 
Interestingly, this evidence suggests that properly designed tax-based consolidation 
plans could be an effective tool for reducing income inequality.  
When we condition the effects of fiscal consolidation on the role played by 
banking crises, the empirical findings suggest that: (i) in the absence of crises episodes, 
fiscal austerity leads to a more unequal distribution of income; (ii) if fiscal consolidation 
is implemented during banking crises, the impact on inequality is negligible; and (iii) in 
the aftermath of a banking crisis, fiscal consolidation substantially rises income 
inequality. Therefore, the impact on the income gap is amplified when fiscal austerity 
takes place after the resolution of banking crises. 
In addition, we find that fiscal austerity combined with inflation boosts 
inequality even further, and show that the effect of fiscal consolidation on inequality is 
amplified during periods of relatively low growth. Similarly, our results support the 
existence of a nonlinear relationship between inequality and income, that is, while per 
capita GDP has a significantly positive effect on inequality, the square of per capita 
GDP has a negative impact. This gives rise to the idea that the benefits of the early 
stages of economic development accrue only to a small share of the population, while 
further increases in per capita GDP eventually reduce inequality. 
Finally, we show that the degree of openness of a country is negatively related 
with income inequality. That is, both the indirect effect of trade on income inequality 
(via boosting economic growth) and its direct impact help narrowing the income gap. 
Consequently, trade may be determinant not only for poverty reduction, but also for 
income equalization. 
The rest of the paper is organized as following. Section 2 reviews the literature 
on fiscal consolidation. Section 3 presents the data and describes the methodological 
approach. Section 4 discusses the empirical results. Section 5 considers the size of the 
consolidation plan and the existence of threshold effects. Section 6 looks at the 
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relationship between fiscal consolidation, banking crises and income inequality. Section 
7 concludes. 
 
2. Review of Literature 
There is a relatively large number of works looking at the potential impact of 
fiscal consolidation on economic growth. Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) challenge the 
common wisdom about the existence of a positive fiscal multiplier. The authors argue 
that fiscal consolidation adjustments can have an expansionary impact on the economy 
via the so-called non-Keynesian effects (Feldstein, 1982). In the same line, Alesina and 
Ardagna (1998, 2010), Miller and Russek (2003) show that growth performance is 
improved after periods of drastic and decisive spending cuts. Castro (2007a) finds that 
the growth of real GDP per capita in the EU was not negatively affected by the 
implementation of fiscal rules and, consequently, the implementation of the Stability 
and Growth Pact was not harmful from a growth perspective. In addition, Castro 
(2007b) argues that low economic growth, a weak fiscal stance and the timing of 
parliamentary elections as well as a majority left-wing government are the major causes 
of excessive deficits. In particular, for EU countries, the constaints imposed by the 
Maastricht criteria seem to have reduced the probability of excessive deficits. 
Interestingly, Heim (2010a, 2010b) shows that government deficits crowd out both 
private consumption and investment. However, while government spending deficits are 
associated with a complete crowding-out effect (i.e. no net stimulus impact), tax cut 
deficits result in net negative economic effects. Afonso and Jalles (2011) point to a 
negative impact of the size of the government on growth and highlight the importance 
of institutional quality. 
From a theoretical point of view, expansionary effects of fiscal adjustments can 
work via both the demand and the supply side. On the demand side, a fiscal adjustment 
may be expansionary if agents believe that the fiscal tightening eliminates the 
expectations about the need of further adjustments in the future (Blanchard, 1990). 
Similarly, increases in taxes and/or spending cuts that are perceived as permanent help 
supporting the belief that the stabilization is credible and avoids a default on 
government debt. As a result, a lower premium on government bonds may be requested 
and the associated (positive) wealth effect can boost private spending (Alesina and 
Ardagna, 2010). In addition, the strong negative relationship between government 
deficits and private spending can operate via credit shortages that are induced by public 
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sector borrowing (Heim, 2010c). On the supply side, expansionary effects of fiscal 
adjustments work via the labour market and via the effect that tax increases and/or 
spending cuts have on the individual labour supply in a neoclassical model, and on the 
unions’ fall-back position in imperfectly competitive labour markets (Alesina and 
Ardagna, 1998). 
Regardless of their impact on GDP, another crucial issue from a policy 
perspective is whether cutting spending or raising taxes is more likely to result in a 
stable fiscal stance and subsequent economic growth when a fiscal consolidation is 
carried out. According to Alesina and Perotti (1995) and Alesina and Ardagna (2010), a 
fiscal consolidation is successful if the reduction in the debt-to-GDP ratio is sufficiently 
large and persistent. Alesina and Ardagna (2010) show that tax cuts are more 
expansionary than spending increases in the cases of a fiscal stimulus. In addition, 
spending cuts are much more effective than tax increases in stabilizing the debt and 
avoiding economic downturns. These results are partially attributable to a more 
substantial monetary stimulus following a fiscal adjustment that is spending-based 
rather than tax-based. In fact, central banks are less likely to loose monetary policy 
when revenue-driven measures (such as indirect tax hikes) that raise prices are already 
in place.  
Tackling a more general question dealing with the effect of fiscal policy on the 
economy, Blanchard and Perotti (2002) find that positive government spending shocks 
increase output, consumption and decrease investment, while positive tax shocks have a 
negative effect on output, consumption and investment. Mountford and Uhlig (2009) 
also point to a negative effect on private investment associated to both taxes and 
spending increases, but spending increases do not generate an increase in consumption. 
Moreover, deficit-financed tax cuts are found to be the most effective way to stimulate 
the economy. Afonso and Sousa (2011) find that unexpected variation in fiscal policy 
can substantially increase the variability of housing and stock prices. Afonso and Sousa 
(2012) show that government spending shocks generally have a small effect on GDP 
and lead to important crowding-out effects. Using narrative approaches, Ramey (2008) 
challenges the positive effect of government spending shocks on private consumption. 
Romer and Romer (2010) also find that an increase in taxation has a small negative 
effect on GDP. 
The literature presented so far has typically addressed the impact of fiscal 
adjustments on the level or the growth rate of aggregate income. However, the sharp 
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increase in deficits and quick debt build up that have been recently observed in many 
developed countries - as a result of the fiscal response to the most recent financial 
turmoil - are now calling for a return to “normal” times via the implementation of fiscal 
austerity. This brings a new question into the scene: what is the impact of fiscal 
consolidation on income distribution? 
Up to now, only a few studies have looked at the distributional effects of fiscal 
policy. Wolff and Zacharias (2007) emphasize that net government spending reduces 
income inequality in a considerable manner and the effect is owed more to expenditures 
than to taxes. Bertola (2010) argues that Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU) had a small (althout significantly positive) impact on income inequality, 
partially reflecting the implementation of less generous social policies. In the same vein, 
Perugini and Martino (2008) assess the determinants of economic inequality within 
European regions. The authors emphasize the role of institutions and the qualitative and 
quantitative aspects of the centrality of labour markets and uncover a positive 
relationship between inequality and growth. Bouvet (2010) uses data for a set of 
European regions and finds that, while income inequality has decreased (mainly because 
of a fall in between-country inequality), the establishment of the convergence criteria 
widened the income gap in less advanced countries. Some research has also highlighted 
that fiscal consolidations: (i) run together with an increase in poverty and a rise in the 
income gap (Smeeding, 2000);1 and (ii) impact on the trade-off between economic 
growth and income inequality (Mulas-Granados, 2005). 
Moreover, the discussion has been centred on how income inequality changes in 
the outcome of a banking crisis. From a theoretical point of view, financial crises can 
lead to bankruptcies and falls in asset prices, generate deep recessions and demand 
policy responses such as bailouts, but their effects on inequality are not clear (Atkinson 
and Morelli, 2011). From an empirical perspective, the 1929 crash was followed by a 
substantial correction in inequality, because wealth losses and financial reforms hit the 
top of income distribution.  
In this context, Stiglitz (2009) suggests that the combination of stagnant real 
incomes and increased borrowing by low income households leads to an unsustainable 
path that makes default and financial crises more likely. Freeman (2010) finds that 
                                                 
1 Notably, Wolff (1996) provides estimates of the distribution of wealth for eight OECD countries and 
shows that wealth inequality: (i) rose substantially in the US; (ii) increased modestly in Sweden; and (iii) 
showed a little decline in Canada, France and the UK. 
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inequality increases dramatically before financial crises. More recently, Agnello and 
Sousa (2011) show that banking crises substantially impact on income distribution, 
rising inequality before the event eclodes and sharply declining it afterwards. The 
authors also suggest that a better access to credit provided by the banking sector leads to 
a more equal distribution of income, but the size of the government does not reduce 
inequality per se. 
The recent financial crisis seems to have witnessed a slight fall in income gap, 
but there is no clear trend on how it will evolve in the future as it depends on the groups 
that are affected and where they are in terms of the income distribution. Notably and as 
pointed by Jenkins et al. (2011), in the case of the Great Recession, countries with a 
relatively strong welfare state did observe a more stable income distribution as a result 
of a greater automatic stabilisation. However, there is a growing sentiment that the 
coming fiscal austerity measures are somewhat unfair and, as the authors emphasize, 
they are likely to have a dramatic impact on inequality. For instance, Ball et al. (2011) 
estimate that a 1 percent of GDP of fiscal consolidation leads to a fall in inflation-
adjusted wage income by 0.9 percent, while inflation-adjusted profit and rents are 
reduced by 0.3 percent. Rather than judging about the merits of such policies, our paper 
tries to provide a comprehensive description of the effects of fiscal consolidation on 
income inequality. 
 
3. Data and Methodological Approach 
We use annual data for 18 industrialized countries and the sample period is 
1978-2009. 
Gini inequality index data comes from the Standardized World Income 
Inequality Database (SWIID). As highlighted by Nolan et al. (2009), this measurement 
of income and wage inequality improves comparability across different studies. More 
specifically, while accounting for the concept, definition of income and recipient unit, it 
captures different points in the distribution and measures income inequality levels and 
trends in a harmonised way. Similarly, as pointed by Solt (2009), it provides a greater 
cross-country and temporal coverage. 
We focus on two different income definitions, i.e. gross or net of taxes. 
Therefore, significant gaps between inequality in gross and net income help explaining 
the differences in redistributive policies across countries. As shown in Figure 1, this 
might be particularly important for the advanced economies included in our sample, as 
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the panel correlation between the gross and the net income inequality indexes is 
relatively low (0.37). 
 
[ INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE ] 
 
Data for per capita GDP and the degree of openness are provided by the World 
Development Indicators of the World Bank and the Penn World Table (PWT) Version 
7.0, respectively (see Heston et al., 2011). 
Finally, the IMF fiscal consolidation episodes are identified from the work of 
Devries et al. (2011), which is based on a narrative approach. As argued by the authors, 
the standard statistical approach focuses on variation in the cyclically adjusted primary 
budget balance (CAPB). However, this framework can lead to biased results for two 
main reasons. First, the CAPB may suffer from measurement error that can be 
correlated with economic developments. Second, it omits periods during which fiscal 
consolidation actions were followed by adverse shocks and offsetting discretionary 
measures. For these reasons, we use the narrative approach to identify episodes of fiscal 
consolidation. More specifically, rather than looking at fiscal outcomes, we follow 
Devries et al. (2011), who assess policy actions that are motivated by deficit reduction 
by examining accounts and records of what countries were intending to do at the time of 
publications (such as the IMF Recent Economic Developments reports, the IMF Staff 
Reports or the OECD Economic Surveys). Therefore, this procedure eliminates the 
endogeneity of the response of fiscal policy to the economy, as it captures 
policymakers’ decisions.2 
As can be seen in Figure 2, fiscal adjustments typically involve substantial 
variation in income inequality measures. Moreover, there is a reasonably large number 
of countries for which fiscal consolidation programs were carried out with a significant 
increase in inequality. This is the case, for instance, of Finland, Italy and Spain in the 
nineties, where aggressive austerity measures amounting up to 3-4 percent of GDP  
were implemented (Devries et al.,2011), or Germany, Japan and Portugal in the eighties, 
where fiscal consolidation totalled, approximately, 0.4-1.4 percent of GDP. These 
                                                 
2 We remark that the current paper looks at consolidation measures that are explicitly motivated by the 
deficit reduction. As a result, other political, institutional and economic factors that may impact on the 
adoption of austerity packages are not taken into account, as this would require the use of a different 
modelling approach. Moreover, from a conceptual point of view, it would also imply a substantial 
departure from the procedure that is used in the identification of the fiscal consolidation episodes. 
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preliminary considerations do not account for the fact that the impact on inequality may 
also depend on the nature of the consolidation program (i.e. whether it is tax- or 
spending-driven), as well as the size of the implemented measures. These are features 
that we will also address in this paper. 
 
[ INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE ] 
 
In order to explore the empirical relationship between gross and net income 
inequality measures and fiscal consolidation, we estimate a panel regression system:3 
࢟௜௧ ൌ ࢄ௜௧ࢼ ൅ ࢻ௜ ൅ ࢛௜௧ ൌ ࢄ௜௧ࢼ ൅ ࢿ௜௧, 
 
 
where the vector  ࢟௜௧ ൌ ൫ݕ௜௧௡௘௧, ݕ௜௧
௚௥௢௦௦൯
′
 includes either the net income Gini inequality 
index or the gross income Gini inequality index, ࢄ௜௧ ൌ ൫࢞ଵ௡௘௧, ࢞ଶ
௚௥௢௦௦൯  is the regressor 
matrix, and ࢼ ൌ ൫ࢼଵ௡௘௧, ࢼଶ
௚௥௢௦௦൯ is the vector of the associated coefficients. Finally, ࢻ௜ 
and ࢛௜௧ denote the latent effects and the genuine country-specific disturbance(with i = 
1, ..., N), respectively. We assume that ࢻ௜  and ࢛௜௧ have zero mean and are mutually 
uncorrelated and uncorrelated with ࢄ௜௧. 
Following Barro (2008), the matrix ࢄ௜௧ includes a core set of variables that have 
been found strongly related with income inequality, namely, the log of per-capita GDP 
and its squared term (which is used to test the Kuznets relationship) and the trade 
openness. 
Figure 3 shows that per capita income and inequality seem to share a nonlinear 
relationship. In fact, the Gini inequality index is typically lower when per capita income 
is either extremely low or substantially high. In contrast, the distribution of income 
tends to be more even for levels of per capita income that are close to the average or the 
median. This may reflect a stronger progressivity of the tax system and a strengthening 
of the welfare system and can help explaining the inverse U-shape relationship between 
per capita GDP and income inequality. 
 
[ INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE ] 
                                                 
3 See Magnus (1982) for the estimation of a Seemingly-Unrelated-Regression (SUR) system with 
balanced panel data and BiØrn (2004) for further extentions to the case of unbalanced panels. 
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In addition, we consider a variety of dummy variables (D) capturing fiscal 
consolidation episodes and aimed at assessing the relationship between income 
inequality and fiscal adjustments. In particular, we account for the timing of the 
potential redistributive effects of the adopted austerity measures by using two dummy 
variables labelled as Dc and Dpc. Based on Devries et al. (2011), the first one takes the 
value one during periods of fiscal consolidation and zero otherwise. The second one 
takes the value of one over the two years after the implementation of austerity measures 
and zero otherwise. Moreover, we analyze the contribution of spending versus tax-
driven consolidation programs by constructing two alternative dummy variables, Dcs 
and Dcr: following Devries et al. (2011), Dcs takes the value of one if the adopted 
austerity measure is driven by a spending cut and zero otherwise; Dcr  takes the value of 
one if the adopted austerity measure is driven by an increase in taxation and zero 
otherwise.  
We remark that all abovementioned dummy variables enter only the net income 
inequality equation. In fact, the set of consolidation measures consists of discretionary 
changes in taxes (increases) and government spending (cuts), which are designed to 
reduce the budget deficit. Therefore, one can only infer about the effects of fiscal 
consolidation on income inequality after deducting direct taxes and social security 
contributions from gross income (i.e., by looking at the net income figures). To do so, 
we impose cross-equations restrictions on the vector of coefficients, ࢼ. Formally, the 
coefficients associated to the dummy variables in the gross income inequality equation 
are assumed to be equal to zero, that is, ࢼଶ
௚௥௢௦௦ ൌ ሼࢼଶ|૙ࡰሽ where ૙ࡰ is the vector of 
zeros. 
 
4. Empirical Findings 
Table 1 provides a summary of the results using the net and gross SWIID Gini 
Index as the measure of income inequality. Column 1 focuses on the IMF consolidation 
periods, Column 3 looks at IMF tax driven and spending driven consolidation episodes, 
and Column 5 addresses IMF consolidation and post-consolidation periods. 
Our findings show that income inequality increases during periods of fiscal 
consolidation (as one can see in Column 1). Moreover, the evidence suggests that fiscal 
adjustments that are driven by the revenue side help reducing the income gap, although 
the effect is not statistically significant. Interestingly, when fiscal consolidation is 
achieved via spending cuts, income inequality seems to widen substantially (see 
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Column 3). In fact, the coefficient associated with spending-driven consolidation 
episodes is positive (0.035), while the one linked with tax-driven fiscal adjustment 
programs is negative (-0.004), in light of the progressivity of taxation. These results are 
close in spirit with the argument by Ball et al. (2001) that fiscal consolidation reduces 
the wage share in total income. The authors suggest that, while the effect on wage 
income is persistent, the fall in capital and property income is short-lived. This can be 
explained by the fact that fiscal austerity plans typically call for a fall in public sector 
wages or lead to an increase in unemployment (in particular, long-term unemployment) 
via the decrease in government consumption or the cut in government investment. As a 
result, although spending cuts can be more effective (than tax increases) at promoting a 
stabilization of the debt and boosting economic growth in the medium-term (as Alesina 
and Ardagna (2010) argue), they are also more likely to lead to an increase in the 
inequality of income distribution (as pointed by Mulas-Granados (2005) regarding the 
European case). 
We also find that the effects of fiscal consolidation on income inequality tend to 
disappear two years after the implementation of the program. As shown in Column 5, 
the coefficient associated with the post-consolidation period is close to zero and not 
statistically significant (0.007). 
Additionally and in line with Barro (2008), our results also point to the usual 
Kuznets relationship i.e. an inverse U-shape curve between income inequality and per 
capita GDP. In fact, while the coefficient associated with per capita GDP is significant 
and always exhibits a positive sign,4 the estimates for the impact of per capita GDP 
squared are negative in magnitude. As a result, for low levels of income, a rise in per 
capita GDP increases income inequality. However, for sufficiently high levels of 
income, one observes the opposite relationship: a boost in per capita GDP reduces 
inequality. This result actually holds for both definitions of income inequality. 
We also show that an increase in the degree of openness of a country leads to 
less divergence in the distribution of income and, thereby, trade seems to be important 
at promoting equality.5 This result gives support to the idea that trade intensifies 
                                                 
4 Notably, Chattopadhyay and Mallick (2007) show that when income follows a log-normal distribution, 
an increase in mean income leads to a reduction in poverty, while an increase in the variance of the 
income raises poverty. 
5 Previous studies offer conflicting theoretical explanations for the effects of trade openness on income 
inequality and the empirical evidence is still inconclusive. Indeed, while some works argue that trade rises 
inequality (Wood, 1994; Rodrik, 1997), others show that it may allow a more even distribution of income 
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economic competition and reduces prices of basic consumption goods (Birdsall, 1998). 
This, in turn, benefits the poor more than the rich, because: (i) competition leads to a 
fall in the monopoly power that is enjoyed by the upper class and, thereby, reduces 
income inequality; and (ii) the poor spend a relatively larger share of their income on 
basic consumption goods. Another argument consistent with our finding is that trade 
increases labour productivity, which brings an increase in wages and a fall in inequality 
(Held et al., 1999). Moreover, to the extent that trade reduces the wages of unskilled 
labour, it can provide incentives for workers to acquire education and for firms to 
employ more unskilled labour, again reducing inequality (Blanchard, 2000). Finally, the 
winners from trade could compensate the losers, reducing inequality, although such 
compensation is not typically done voluntarily (Rodrik, 1997; Salvatore, 1998). 
 
[ INSERT TABLE 1 HERE ] 
 
In Table 2, we also control for the effect of inflation (as a proxy for the cost of 
living) and economic growth on income inequality. In particular, we test if fiscal 
austerity combined with inflation increases inequality. To this end, we interact the 
inflation rate with the fiscal consolidation dummy variable. In addition, we further 
explore the relationship between inequality and GDP developments, namely, by 
replacing the consolidation dummy variable with a pair of dummy variables: the first 
one refers to consolidation measures undertaken during periods of sustained economic 
growth (i.e. above 2%); and the second one captures episodes of fiscal consolidation 
that were implemented in periods characterized by relatively low growth (i.e. a GDP 
growth rate below 2%). 
In line with Albanesi (2007), our results show that there is a strongly positive 
relationship between inflation and income inequality. Moreover, we find that the effects 
of inflation are magnified during periods of fiscal consolidation. Indeed, the interaction 
term between inflation and the dummy variable for consolidation is statistically 
significant and the coefficient associated with this variable is positive (0.005). Finally, 
we provide evidence that consolidation programs are detrimental for income, in 
particular, during periods of relatively low growth: the coefficient associated with the 
interaction between consolidation and growth below 2% is positive (0.010) and almost 
                                                                                                                                               
(Birdsall, 1998; Salvatore, 1998; Held et al., 1999; Blanchard, 2000). Our findings are in line with this 
second strand of the literature. 
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two times as large as the coefficient associated with the interaction between 
consolidation and growth above 2% (0.006). 
 
[ INSERT TABLE 2 HERE ] 
 
5. Does the Size of Fiscal Consolidation Matter? 
In this section, we extend the previous analysis by considering the 
characteristics of the consolidation plan in terms of its size and the existence of 
threshold effects in the relationship between income inequality and the size of 
consolidation. 
We start by distinguishing between tax- and spending-based measures with sizes 
(in percentage of GDP) that are higher or lower than their corresponding sample 
averages over the period of the analysis (Table 3).   
 
[ INSERT TABLE 3 HERE ] 
 
Next, we replace the fiscal consolidation dummy variables with the size (in 
percentage of GDP) of each adopted consolidation measure, as reported by Devries et 
al. (2011). Then, benchmark models (1) are estimated. 
The results are reported in columns (1)-(2) of Table 4. Overall, they confirm that 
the larger the size of the fiscal consolidation package is, the stronger the impact on 
income inequality will be. However, when we look at the characteristics of the fiscal 
consolidation plan, we find that inequality is generally driven by the size of the 
spending cuts. This can be associated with the theoretical view that austerity measures 
that mainly rely on government consumption (especially, the wage bill) and/or social 
transfer cuts have a high probability of generating strong economic growth and reducing 
the debt ratio (Alesina and Perotti, 1995).  
In contrast, our estimates indicate that tax-driven austerity plans contribute to 
reducing inequality. This might be the result of an increase of the tax-system 
progressiveness (direct effect) and/or a rise of additional revenue to finance growth-
enhancing expenditure (indirect effect). Consequently, reducing the government debt 
and deficit could be achieved in an equitable way via tax-hikes.. 
We also test for the presence of threshold effects in the relationship among 
inequality and the size of consolidation. A summary of the results can be found in 
14 
 
Columns (3)-(4). Interestingly, Column 3 shows that consolidation plans that amount to 
less than 1% of GDP have a more detrimental impact on income inequality than 
austerity measures that are bigger in size (i.e. that represent more than 1% of GDP) 
(0.034 versus 0.018, respectively). This suggests that the burden of the consolidation 
program is shared unevenly when the size of the plan in relatively small, affecting more 
negatively the households at the bottom of the income distribution. In the same line of 
reasoning and similar in spirit with this finding, Mallick and Granville (2005) argue that 
debt relief (which could be achieved, for instance, via fiscal consolidation) would only 
provide a temporary (although not sustainable) solution to poverty reduction. 
Only when the size of the program is reasonably large, does the evidence 
support that rich households are requested to participate more strongly in the 
consolidation effort and, as a result, the impact on inequality is much smaller.   
This result seems to hold even when we consider the composition effects 
(Column 4) and, in particular, for tax-driven consolidation programs. In fact, while 
spending cuts above 0.77% of GDP lead to an important widening of the income gap,  
tax rises above 0.57% of GDP contribute to a large fall in inequality. From a policy 
perspective, the last result suggests that properly designed tax-based consolidation plans 
could be an effective tool for promoting a more even distribution of income.  
 
[ INSERT TABLE 4 HERE ] 
 
Finally, we assess the importance of accounting for the optimal level of fiscal 
consolidation. Putting it differently, fiscal consolidation can be labeled as “successful” 
if it helps reducing the deficit-to-GDP ratio in a substantial manner. Therefore, we 
restrict our sample of consolidation episodes to those associated with a significant 
improvement of the CAPB (amounting to 1.5% of GDP) and re-estimate the baseline 
models. This exercise can be thought as a combination of the narrative (as in Devries et 
al. (2011)) and the statistical (as in Alesina and Ardagna (2009)) approaches for 
identifying fiscal consolidation programs. 
The results are shown in Table 5 and corroborate our previous findings. In fact, 
they show that fiscal consolidation is typically associated with a more unequal income 
distribution (Column 1) and while spending driven consolidation episodes lead to a 
widening of the income gap, tax-based consolidation programs help narrowing it 
(Column 3). Similarly, the size of the fiscal consolidation package is positively related 
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with income inequality (Column 5), but there is an important composition effect: the 
size of tax-driven fiscal consolidation (in percentage of GDP) guarantees that inequality 
is reduced, while the size of spending cut-based consolidation (in percentage of GDP) is 
detrimental for the distribution of income. In addition, we still uncover a nonlinear 
relationship between inequality and per capita GDP and find that trade openness is 
beneficial for income equalization. 
 
[ INSERT TABLE 5 HERE ] 
 
6. Fiscal Consolidation and Banking Crises 
A number of authors analyzed the link between income inequality, household 
debt leverage and financial crises, and emphasized the role of credit demand (Rajan, 
2010) or credit supply (Fitoussi and Saraceno, 2010) in explaining the high debt levels 
of households at the bottom of income distribution. For this reason, Hubbard (2010) 
argues that policymakers appear to be responsible for the latest crises. 
Similarly, Moss (2009) investigates whether huge income gaps create “wrong” 
incentives that increase the vulnerability of the financial system. Blair (2010) shows 
that, because asset bubbles typically lead to higher returns, the banking system has the 
potential to generate highly leveraged systems and increase inequality. 
From an historical perspective, banking crises typically preceded or coincided 
with sovereign debt crises (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2011). Some reasons for this pattern 
can be associated with the contingent liability argument, whereby the government steps 
in and takes on massive debts from the private banks, which ultimately undermines its 
own solvency (Diaz-Alejandro, 1985). Another potential explanation lies on the “twin 
crisis” story, where banking crises occur before currency crashes and these may, in turn, 
lead to the insolvency of sovereign borrowers who hold large amounts of foreign-
currency denominated liabilities (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999).  
Whatever the theoretical ground underlying the temporal sequence between 
banking crises and sovereign debt crises is, the need to restore fiscal sustainability 
afterwards forces governments to reduce their budget deficits via the implementation of 
fiscal consolidation programs. As a result, we investigate the impact of such fiscal 
adjustments undertaken during and after the occurrence of financial crises as identified 
by Laeven and Valencia (2010) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2011). 
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More specifically, we assess the conditional dependence of the redistributive 
effects on the occurrence of financial crises. To that end, the consolidation dummy 
variable, Dc, as defined in Section 3 is interacted with the series dating banking crisis as 
provided by Laeven and Valencia (2010) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2011). We also 
construct a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the fiscal consolidation 
measures are adopted immediately after the end of banking crises. 
Table 6 provides a summary of the findings. The empirical evidence provides 
some interesting results. First, when fiscal consolidation is implemented during banking 
crises, the impact on inequality is not statistically significant. Second, in the absence of 
crises episodes, fiscal austerity leads to a more unequal distribution of income: the 
coefficients associated with consolidation programs during no banking crises are 
statistically significant and positive for both the identification based on the work of 
Laeven and Valencia (2010) – i.e. 0.025 – and the research by Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2011) – i.e. 0.015. Third, in the aftermath of a banking crisis, fiscal consolidation has a 
strongly positive impact on income inequality. That is, compared to the benchmark case 
of no banking crises, the impact on the income gap is magnified when austerity plans 
are implemented after the resolution of banking crises. 
 
[ INSERT TABLE 6 HERE ] 
 
7. Conclusions 
After the substantial reduction in public deficits during the nineties and early 
2000s, the fiscal stance of many OECD countries has strongly deteriorated. Similarly, 
while until early 2010 policymakers questioned whether tax cuts or spending increases 
were a better recipe for boosting the economy, the subsequent developments in 
government bond markets signalled doubts about the long-term sustainability of the 
debt path and led to the implementation of fiscal austerity. 
In this paper, we look at fiscal consolidation via the lenses on its impact on 
income inequality. We find that the income gap indeed increases during periods of fiscal 
adjustments. Considering the size effects of fiscal consolidation packages, we find that 
while spending cuts are detrimental for income inequality especially when their size is 
larger than 0.77% of GDP, tax hikes contribute to a strong fall in inequality. In 
particular, such equalizing effects are magnified when taxation is above 0.57% of GDP.   
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Conditioning the impact of fiscal consolidation on the occurrence of a banking crisis, 
we find that income becomes much more unequally distributed in the post-crisis period. 
However, even in the absence of crises episodes, we do observe a rise in inequality 
associated with the implementation of fiscal consolidation.  
Finally, we confirm the existence of a nonlinear (inverse-U) relationship 
between inequality and growth and find that inflation and low growth amplify the 
detrimental impact of fiscal consolidation on inequality. We also show that the higher 
the degree of openness of is, the lower the level of inequality will be. As a result, trade 
can help countries to achieve long-term economic prosperity and to reduce income 
inequality.   
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List of Tables 
Table 1. Income inequality and fiscal consolidation 
(Evidence from the SWIID net and gross Gini Index). 
 Dependent Variable 
Explanatory variable Gini Index (SWIID) 
 Net Gross Net Gross Net Gross 
log (per capita GDP) 0.250*** 0.359*** 0.260*** 0.358*** 0.249*** 0.357*** 
 [0.019] [0.018] [0.019] [0.018] [0.019] [0.018] 
log (per capita GDP) squared -0.011*** -0.014*** -0.012*** -0.014*** -0.011*** -0.013*** 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Consolidation periods (Dc) 0.026***    0.028***  
 [0.004]    [0.004]  
Tax driven consolidation episodes (Dcr)   -0.004    
   [0.006]    
Spending driven consolidation episodes (Dcs)   0.035***    
   [0.005]    
Post-consolidation period (Dpc)#     0.007  
     [0.005]  
Openness -0.024** -0.131*** -0.043*** -0.126*** -0.024** -0.129*** 
 [0.011] [0.010] [0.011] [0.010] [0.011] [0.010] 
       
Observations 518 518 518 518 518 518 
Number of countries 18 18 18 18 18 18 
Tests:       
Ho: Dcr=Dcs   30.12    
   (0.00)***    
Ho: Dc=Dpc     12.2  
     (0.00)***  
Note: The dependent variables are the Gini indexes. Standard errors of coefficients are in square brackets, p-values in parenthesis.   
  # Two years after the implementation of the consolidation program. 
 
Table 2. Income inequality and fiscal consolidation 
(The effect of inflation and economic growth).  
Net Income Gini Index 
log (per capita GDP) 0.286*** 0.297*** 0.262*** 
[0.019] [0.019] [0.019] 
log (per capita GDP) squared -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.012*** 
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Consolidation Periods (Dc) 0.029*** 0.013** 
[0.004] [0.006] 
Openness -0.022** -0.030*** -0.022** 
[0.011] [0.011] [0.011] 
Inflation 0.007*** 0.005*** 
[0.001] [0.001] 
Consolidation x Inflation 0.005*** 
[0.001] 
Consolidation x (growth>2%) 0.006*** 
[0.002] 
Consolidation x (growth<2%) 0.010*** 
[0.003] 
Note: The dependent variable is the net income Gini index. Standard errors of coefficients are in square 
brackets. 
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Table 3. Consolidation size. 
Variable Number of  
episodes 
Average (%GDP) Min (%GDP) Max (%GDP) 
Consolidation size>0.99%GDP 68 1.87 0.99 4.74 
Consolidation size<0.99%GDP 97 0.48 0.03 0.98 
Tax-based >0.57%GDP 41 1.17 0.60 2.54 
Tax-based <0.57%GDP 86 0.29 0.00 0.56 
Spending cut-based>0.77%GDP 50 1.47 0.80 3.71 
Spending cut-based<0.77%GDP 90 0.37 0.00 0.76 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Income inequality and fiscal consolidation (Size effects). 
 Dependent Variable 
Explanatory variable Net Income Gini Index (SWIID) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
log (per capita GDP) 0.258*** 0.263*** 0.259*** 0.258*** 
 [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] 
log (per capita GDP) squared -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Consolidation size %GDP 0.018*** -   
 [0.003] -   
Tax-based size %GDP  -0.010*   
  [0.005]   
Spending cut-based %GDP  0.030***   
   [0.004]    
Consolidation size>0.99%GDP   0.018***  
   [0.003]  
Consolidation size<0.99%GDP   0.034***  
   [0.009]  
Tax-based >0.57%GDP    -0.012** 
    [0.006] 
Tax-based <0.57%GDP    0.022 
    [0.017] 
Spending cut-based>0.77%GDP    0.029*** 
    [0.004] 
Spending cut-based<0.77%GDP    0.008 
       [0.012] 
Openness -0.020* -0.027** -0.021** -0.029*** 
 [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] 
Observations 518 518 518 518 
Number of countries 18 18 18 18 
Tests:     
Ho: Above=Below   3.36  
   (0.06)*  
Note: For sake of space, we report estimates of equation with the net income Gini index as the dependent 
variable. Standard errors of coefficients are in square brackets, p-values in parenthesis.   
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Table 6. Income inequality and fiscal consolidation 
(Evidence for banking crises episodes). 
 Banking crises Identification 
 Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) Laeven and Valencia (2010) 
 Net Gross Net Gross 
log (per capita GDP) 0.241*** 0.301*** 0.271*** 0.393*** 
 [0.019] [0.018] [0.019] [0.018] 
log (per capita GDP) squared -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.015*** 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Consolidation (IMF) during banking crises -0.006  0.003  
 [0.010]  [0.013]  
Consolidation (IMF) after banking crises (A)# 0.036***  0.099***  
 [0.007]  [0.010]  
Consolidation (IMF) during no banking crises (B) 0.015***  0.025***  
 [0.005]  [0.005]  
Openness -0.059*** -0.073*** -0.019* -0.151*** 
 [0.011] [0.010] [0.011] [0.010] 
Number of consolidation episodes:     
During banking crises  84  11  
After banking crises 64  29  
During no financial crises 25  133  
Observations 518  518  
Number of countries 18  18  
Tests:     
Ho: A=B 7.04  45.4  
 (0.00)***  (0.00)***  
Note: The dependent variables are the Gini indexes. Standard errors of coefficients are in square brackets, p-values in 
parenthesis. # Two years after the implementation of the consolidation program. 
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Figure 3. The nonlinear relationship between per capita GDP and income inequality. 
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